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since the collapse of the soviet union, moscow has become a 
global city with a vibrant urban and cultural life—one of the most 
expensive capitals in the world with famous clubs and restaurants as 
well as one of the most popular destinations for city workers and diplo-
mats. Has corruption been instrumental in Moscow’s development? 
The answer is complicated and in many ways a matter of definition. It 
depends on whether one considers informal practices—inherited from 
Soviet times as well as the new era—as corrupt and how one concep-
tualizes corruption. I will illustrate some of these complications for 
the case of the Soviet practice of blat, explain its “monetization” and 
evolving relationship with corruption in the post-Soviet transition, and 
analyze the role of informal networks in present-day Russia. 
Blat is best defined as the use of personal networks for obtain-
ing goods and services in short supply and for circumventing formal 
procedures. Blat networks channeled an alternative currency—an 
informal exchange of favors—that introduced elements of the market 
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into the planned economy and loosened up the rigid constraints of 
the political regime. Blat merged with patterns of sociability to such 
an extent that people were unable to distinguish between friendship 
and the use of friendship. The boundaries became particularly blurred 
as the exchanged favors were favors of a particular kind—“favors of 
access.”
Both in literature and in conversations, blat is often referred to 
as corrupt practice. This may be right in certain contexts but it is also 
misleading, for neither blat nor corruption has a clear or single meaning, 
nor are these terms independent of moral judgements. Corruption is 
commonly defined as the use of public office for private advantage (the 
latter term being understood not only in a pecuniary sense but also in 
terms of status and influence). However, as Friedrich (1966: 74-5), follow-
ing Weber, has pointed out, the use of private office for private advan-
tage is not always perceived as corrupt.1 When Weber set out an “ideal 
type” of bureaucracy, he associated it with a hierarchical division of 
labor, directed by explicit rules that are impersonally applied; staffed by 
full-time, lifetime professionals who do not in any sense own the “means 
of administration” or their jobs or the sources of their funds, and live 
off a salary rather than from income derived directly from the perfor-
mance of their job. These are all features found in the public service, in 
the offices of private firms, in universities, and so on. Weber contrasted 
the bureaucracy to “prebends” or “benefices,” meaning an “office” with 
some income-yielding property—for example, a farm or tax-gathering 
rights from which the officeholder lives (1968). The notion of corruption 
made little sense in patrimonial systems where jobs were given away in 
order to “feed” their holders. The prebend officially “owns” his job and 
expects tribute for performing it, as opposed to a modern bureaucrat, 
who is paid a salary for following the official rules reliably and is not 
allowed to charge fees for himself or to accept gifts (as this constitutes 
the “misuse of public office for private gain”). 
Corruption is therefore a modern concept, associated with the 
transformation of what Weber described as patrimonial power struc-
tures, where decisions are taken not on the basis of institutional-
ized rules but on the basis of personal relationships and traditional 
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forms of authority. Transformations of this kind led to rational-legal 
and legal systems, where rules are institutionalized to such an extent 
that corruption can be conceptualized as the deviation from them. A 
dehistoricized notion of corruption, however, is unusable in societies 
with patrimonial legacies. Not all postcommunist countries meet the 
modernity standard set by Weber. The lack of a clear division between 
public and private in postcommunist countries generates forms of 
expediency and rationality that are not conducive to modernity and 
present an obstacle to the rationality of the “rule of law.” Even in 
modern contexts, the clash between an abstract definition of corrup-
tion and its application to a complex real world has resulted in distinc-
tions between so-called “good,” “bad” and “ambiguous”—or white, 
black and grey—corruption (Heidenheimer, 1970: 26-7). According to 
Lampert (1984: 371), cases of corruption have a ranking specific to 
the society. The Soviets clearly felt that bribery was a worse form of 
corruption than a small-scale use of public resources for private ends 
(such as using workers to do private jobs in enterprise time). Cultural 
connotations of money as “dirty” made nonmonetary transactions 
fairly legitimate (Humphrey, 2000). This was in tune with the distinc-
tion drawn between various forms of offense in the criminal code and 
the different penalties for engaging in them (Heinzen, 2007). Blat was 
not on the criminal scale at all and could not strictly speaking be char-
acterized as illegal (by reason of its small scale or recognized necessity 
[voiti v polozhenie]), thus falling in the category of “good” or “ambig-
uous” corruption (see also Krastev, 2004). The oppressive nature of 
the communist regime, and its privilege-based way of distributing 
goods, introduces another twist in interpretation of the nature of blat 
practices: if blat corrupted the corrupt regime, can we refer to it as 
corruption? 
With these considerations in mind, to equate blat and corruption 
in Soviet conditions is to misunderstand the nature of Soviet socialism. 
Historicizing blat helps identifying its important place in the functioning 
of socialism vis-à-vis patrimonialism and modernity. Contextualizing blat 
helps establishing that it commonly aimed at obtaining food, goods, and 
services that people were entitled to have. In the folklore definition of the 
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six paradoxes of socialism, every paradox can be explained by informal 
practice, widespread but hidden from outsiders (as in square brackets): 
 No unemployment but nobody works. [Absenteeism]
 Nobody works but productivity increases. [False reporting]
 Productivity increases but shops are empty. [Shortages]
 Shops are empty but fridges are full. [Blat]
 Fridges are full but nobody is satisfied. [Unfair privileges]
 Nobody is satisfied but all vote unanimously. [Cynicism]2
These practices were the open secrets of socialism, commonly 
known but officially unacknowledged and rarely registered in written 
sources inside the country. It is only since the Soviet Union has collapsed 
that people have been able to reflect on such practices (just as in the 1950s, 
those who left the Soviet Union were able to describe their blat experience 
in the Harvard Interviewing Project (Fitzpatrick, 2000a; 2000b). 
 Blat developed together with the regime and reflected its changes: 
at first there were the basic necessities such as food, jobs, and living 
space, helping kulaks to escape exile or making it possible for Bolsheviks 
to christen their babies despite the party ban on religious rituals. Then 
came the more sophisticated needs of late socialism associated with 
education, mobility and consumerism. But although there may seem to 
be a parallel between the way contacts were used in Bolshevik Russia (for 
example, in order to conceal class origins given the constraints of the 
Bolshevik demand for a proletarian background), and in postcommunist 
Russia (where contacts could allow one to be “appointed” a millionaire), 
this is misleading. The nature of the regime and its constraints on human 
behavior does matter in assessing the role of informal practices. 
Informal practices are intrinsically ambivalent in their func-
tions: they both serve the regime and the people, while simultaneously 
undermining the regime and corrupting the people. In authoritar-
ian regimes, the outcome of such ambivalence is “corruption with a 
human face”—the underside that lubricated the rigidity of political and 
economic constraints. As people used to say, the “severity of our laws is 
compensated for by their nonobservance.”
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The power of informal networks was such that blat—the use of 
personal networks for obtaining goods and services in short supply and 
for circumventing formal procedures—can be effectively conceptual-
ized as the know-how of the Soviet system and the reverse side of the 
over-controlling center. On the one hand, the Soviet regime was pene-
trated by widely spread informal practices, depended on it, and allowed 
them to compensate for its own rigidity. On the other hand informal 
practices served individual needs and facilitated some personal free-
dom and choice. The power of networks to tackle the economic, politi-
cal, ideological, and social pressures of the socialist system effectively 
meant that the system worked against its own proclaimed principles. 
Yet paradoxically, by subverting the socialist system, the power of 
networks also supported it. 
Thus research into blat has helped solve a double puzzle in the 
history of authoritarian regimes: how people survived in an economy of 
shortage, and how the regime survived under similar constraint. But it 
also opened an avenue to explore the nature of political and economic 
regimes from a new perspective—the perspective of informal practices. 
Informal practices have become an important indicator in assessing 
models of governance. In How Russia Really Works I have identified the 
informal practices that have replaced blat in the functioning of the 
political and economic institutions of the 1990s (Ledeneva, 2006). 
WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO BLAT SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF 
THE SOVIET UNION?
There is no satisfactory answer to this question. If you claim that the 
influence of blat has declined and the term has become obsolete, people 
overwhelm you with examples. But if you argue that blat continues to 
operate, they reply that the term is out of fashion and it is now all 
about money. In fact both tendencies can be seen. Change is happen-
ing to a varying degree in different sectors and contexts. As a term blat 
emerged to designate Soviet practices characteristic of state-centralized 
regimes and economies of shortage. Once the economy of shortage has 
given place to markets of goods and capital, blat loses its relevance for 
everyday consumption but is still important to get access to jobs, medi-
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cine, education etc. Consider the most recent 2007 data I collected in a 
national representative survey conducted by the Levada Center. When 
asked to define blat nowadays by choosing as many prompts as neces-
sary, 18 percent of respondents indicated that the term is out of use 
and 5 percent noted that the word blatnoi means criminal—that is, has 
returned to its original pre-revolutionary meaning. At least a quarter 
of respondents associated blat with an exchange of favors (22 percent) 
or best described by a proverb “I scratch your back, you scratch mine” 
(ty-mne, ya-tebe) (15 percent). With regard to formal constraints, the 
responses were: “circumvention of formal rules and procedures” (17 
percent), “problem solving” (12 percent), “blat is the necessity in order 
to give a bribe” (6 percent) or gain access to administrative resources 
(4 percent). Tellingly, only 7 percent of respondents found it difficult 
to answer this question and there were respondents who offered their 
Table 1. “What Did You Use Your Contacts for in the Last Seven Years?”
(Multiple choices possible, percent of those admitting the use of contacts)
Medical services: local surgery, hospital or bed and operation 
(15+6+3) 
24
Solving problems with the traffic police, registration of a 
vehicle and MOT (10+8) 
18
Finding a job 12
Education: Places in primary-secondary and higher educa-
tion (7+5) 
12
Legal services and courts (2+3) 5
Army conscription 4
Everyday services at better quality or better price (3 +1) 4
Repairs of housing, garages, dachas 3
Tickets for events, theatre, concerts 2
Hobbies 1
Consumer goods 1
Foodstuffs 1
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own definitions (including “blat is higher than under Stalin” and “blat is 
a leftover of socialism” (izderzhki sotsializma) as well as “blat is the corrupt 
system, the whole industry” and “blat is life” —compare this with much 
higher numbers of “don’t knows” in surveys cited later in this paper).
In response to the question about the uses of blat, the hierarchy 
of needs presented in table 1 is the reverse of what it was in during 
the Soviet period. Then blat was essential for obtaining foodstuffs, 
consumer goods, books, and theater tickets and was more or less an 
omnipresent practice. Today these items are at the bottom of the list 
and mentioned by 1 percent of respondents each (see table 1). In 2007, 
the services that still required blat were medicine, education, employ-
ment, and the traffic police. 
This hierarchy of needs outlined above is not specific to Russia; 
middle classes use contacts for medical or educational purposes in 
many societies. The impact of informal networks on an institutional 
environment is one of degree. What distinguishes the Russian case is 
the scale of the use of informal practices. In response to the question 
“In your opinion, how widespread is blat in your city or region now?” 
two-thirds of respondents said it is widespread or rather widespread in 
December 2007, which given the data on the underdeveloped middle-
class in Russia, indicates a much wider base (see table 2).
Table 2. “How Widespread Is Blat in Your City or Region?”
Frequency Percent Cumulative
Percent
Widespread 454 28 28
Rather widespread 613 38 66
Not very widespread 208 13 79
Practically absent 63 4 83
Difficult to answer 264 17 100
Total 1601 100
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However, if one interprets these data on the basis of blat in its 
Soviet sense (as serving the economy of shortages of food and services), 
one misses a crucial point. A new shortage has emerged in postcommu-
nist Russia—money—and blat has had to adjust to it. In Soviet society 
money played only a small role and access to goods and services meant 
everything. Now that the capital and commodity markets work and 
access to goods and services is available, it is access to money, making a 
living, and getting a well-paid job become the “new power” of personal 
networks. Not only have networks reoriented themselves to serve this 
new type of shortage, the use of contacts has become “monetized” in 
the sense that money is not excluded from personalized transactions. 
This is particularly pronounced in the private sector that emerged in 
post-Soviet Russia and significantly shifted the use of networks towards 
needs of business. According to the INDEM data, only 10 percent of the 
corruption market is associated with so-called household corruption, 
the monetized version of what used to be a fairly nonmonetized form 
of blat exchanges in the Soviet period (Satarov, 2005). In present-day 
Russia, ways of “beating the system” formerly associated with blat now 
amount to only 10 percent of the overall corruption market. Household 
corruption has given way to business-related corruption. About 90 
percent of bribes in Russia are paid by businessmen for export licens-
ing and quotas, state budget transactions, tax transfers, customs duties, 
privatization deals, and servicing debts to the federal budget. New 
informal practices, such as tax evasion and creative accounting, have 
emerged to compensate for the institutional defects of the economic 
transition (Ledeneva, 2006). 
INFORMAL PRACTICES: ARE THEY A PROBLEM OR A 
SOLUTION?
It was assumed that once the centralized system ceased to exist, there 
would not be a need for alternative currencies or an extensive use of 
informal networks. Markets would take care of functions that used to 
be performed by informal networks. However, research shows that not 
only does the use of networks not diminish—it actually goes up, espe-
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cially in newly emerging sectors (Miller et al., 2001; Rose, 2001). The 
legacy of socialism is often blamed, and the Soviet grip is indeed part of 
the story. But one must not dismiss the rationality of informal practices 
and their effectiveness for problem solving. In a transitional period, the 
defects of markets were compensated for by informal networks; low 
levels of trust in state institutions and insufficiently developed imper-
sonal systems placed emphasis on interpersonal trust. 
My research into the 1990s shows that informal practices, serv-
ing the emergence of democratic and market institutions even if some-
times in semi-legitimate way, are not automatically detrimental (even 
creative campaigning by methods of black piar and kompromat are argu-
ably preferable in terms of voting behavior than the noncompetitive 
elections of the later period). In any case, the view that informal prac-
tices have a negative impact is in itself a normative judgment and cannot 
be merely assumed without detailed research. I have argued against the 
stigmatization of informal practices and suggested the importance of 
distinguishing between their supportive and their subversive effect on 
political and economic development. The ambiguity of informal prac-
tices is an important theoretical assumption that allows us to differenti-
ate between the functions of networks and to analyze their multivector 
functionality: from sociability, safety nets, survival kits, and forms 
of social capital to means of access, diversion of resources, bridging 
formal organizations, and subverting formal procedures, thus blocking 
the effectiveness of governance (Ledeneva, 2008). In empirical terms, 
it is much more important to identify the various levels/sectors of the 
economy and society at which they are particularly problematic.
Yet the reasons for the emergence of informal practices (survival, 
shortage, cornered behavior) are not the same as the reasons for their 
reproduction (vested interests)—this accounts for the fundamental 
changes in the use of networks in the post-Soviet period in Russia and 
elsewhere. What once was thought of as a solution can become a prob-
lem. Hernando de Soto’s analysis of the Latin American informal sector 
suggests that policy should integrate the perspective of informal prac-
tices and legalize them where possible (2002).
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The comparative analysis of the role of blat in Russia and analo-
gous practices of networking in China, guanxi, seems to indicate that 
the informal practices that have proliferated among elites in both 
regimes tend to exclude ordinary people from the rights and oppor-
tunities that markets are supposed to have opened up. Comparative 
studies of informal practices show the degree to which many features 
of human behavior are universal, especially in terms of networking and 
informal exchange, but there are huge differences their functionality 
and implications in different regimes (Ledeneva, 2008b).3
An interdisciplinary approach is essential for understanding the 
workings of informal networks: one has to grasp the history of blat, its 
political significance and the ideological nature of bargaining powers, 
its economic functions, the social skills and divisions behind blat, and 
the anthropological aspects of the informal exchange of favors (not 
exactly an exchange of gifts but not one of commodities either). Favors 
of a specific kind—favors regarding access—is a concept relevant for 
regimes with state-centralized distribution systems but it may become 
relevant in other types of regimes where the state plays a central role in 
the bailout of private financial institutions (the 2008 financial crisis in 
Russia has certainly put the oligarchs in a queue for a bailout).4
Studies of informal networks have helped develop the postcom-
munist or postsocialist (as anthropologists refer to it) academic field. 
Blat research has been relevant for studying social capital, consump-
tion, labor markets, entrepreneurship, trust, mobility and migration, 
shortages, barter, survival strategies, alternative currencies, the shadow 
economy, redistribution and remittance economies, and democracy. 
All these developments illustrate efforts to reintegrate social dimen-
sions into studies of politics and economy. Where the literature tends 
to focus on political and economic aspects exclusively, the “informal” 
perspective contributes insights into social forces at play. The use of 
informal practices does not admit to quantitative analysis as readily as 
other phenomena but provides explanatory tools for social scientists 
and analysts attempting to understand Russian behavior. Just as the 
Corruption Perception Index is often used as a proxy for corruption,5 a 
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similar quantification of data on the use of informal networks is possi-
ble and will reveal the difference in the perception of corruption and of 
informal practices (Rose and Mishler, 2007). 
THE POWER OF NETWORKS VS. NETWORKS OF POWER 
My quest began with the analysis of informal networks at the bottom, 
continued with analysis of their transformation, and will be completed 
by an analysis of patterns of informality at the top—the networks of 
power. Because the grassroots networks that balanced the rigidity of 
authoritarian regime in Soviet Russia to some extent have not been able 
to channel their power into the creation of a robust civil society in the 
post-Soviet period (Ledeneva, 1997), the result has been a disproportion-
ate influence of networks at the top and yet another failure to change 
Russia’s governance system. It is because of its weak civil society and 
low levels of trust in public institutions that Russia is still considered 
to be premodern (Shlapentokh, 2006). In academic literature “premod-
ern” is associated with widespread patterns of informality throughout a 
society—that is, (a) the use of informal networks to compensate for the 
failure of formal organizations; (b) high levels of interpersonal trust as 
a substitute for the low levels of impersonal trust in public institutions; 
(c) the personalization of bureaucracy, and consequently (d) a clan- and 
network-based state.
The existing concepts that explore features of the sistema in 
Russia (clan, anti-modern networks or network state) are in some ways 
unsatisfactory. They aim at getting to the “informality of the system” 
through personal associations and miss out on the importance of 
formal organizations, as well as brokerage and the relative openness 
of informal networks and recruitment through “weak ties.” To date, 
there is no ethnography of public administration in Russia. Issues of 
unwritten rules, informal exchanges, and the inner workings of infor-
mal networks in state institutions have been under-researched. This 
is partly attributable to the difficulty of access and generalization on 
these issues. Also, “elite studies” focused on the quantitative and quali-
tative analysis of discourse (Gudkov et al., 2007; 2008; Oleinik, 2008), 
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the formation of clans (Kryshtanovskaya and White, 2005; Wedel, 2003; 
Kosals, 2007; Mukhin, 2005); anti-modern networks (Rose, 2001; Rose 
and Mishler, 2007); the network state (Steen, 2003) and network society 
(Castells, 2000), and their association with the middle class (Gudkov et 
al., 2008).
Because the mapping of the clans and networks of siloviki, associ-
ated with the ministries in charge of force (army, security, police, etc.) 
has already been done (Kryshtanovskaya, 2005), I focus here on the 
patterns of informality that lie at the heart of their formation. Whereas 
clans and circles might be changing in terms of specific personalities 
and configurations, the patterns of influence, dependence, and control 
are fairly universal and reinvent themselves in changing environ-
ments (such as the pattern of joint responsibility [krugovaya poruka]) (see 
Keenan, 1986; Hosking, 2004; Ledeneva, 2004; 2006). 
One should not think about informality simply in terms of 
“personalization of bureaucracy” or “patron-client relationships” pene-
trating formal structures of governance throughout Russia’s history. 
Informality is the pattern of governance, even if hidden behind the 
formal discourses. It is rarely acknowledged as such but is often referred 
to in a commonly used euphemism “sistema.” What is sistema? Recent 
content analysis of interviews with Russian elites shows that sistema 
is the third most frequently used term after “business” and “money” 
(Oleinik, 2008: 69). Lilia Shevtsova defines the Russian system as
a specific type of governance structure whose characteris-
tics include paternalism, the state domineering over the 
individual, isolation from the outside world, and ambi-
tions to be a great power. The heart of the system was the 
all-powerful leader, above the law and a law unto himself, 
concentrating in his hands all powers, without a balancing 
accountability, and limiting all other institutions to auxil-
iary, administrative functions. The Russian system did not 
need fixed rules of the game; it needed fixers (Shevtsova 
2003: 16).
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 Networks on the top operate on familiar principles of informal-
ity that impose certain norms of reciprocity and informal constraints 
on people in official positions: blurred boundaries between friendship 
and the use of friendship; helping a friends at the expense of public/
corporate resources or access; recruitment into networks according 
to a particular logic—it could be loyalty, dependence or transgres-
sion/ compromised recruit—rather than the logic of competition and 
professionalism. Although there might not be significant differences 
in patterns of informal constraints at the bottom and the top, there are 
implications for the process of research. Insights into the workings of 
the federal Russian state or the workings of regional administrations 
are almost entirely ruled out for outsiders, let alone the Kremlin admin-
istration and their ties to business, the media and the judiciary. 
To capture the operation of networks of power, a researcher 
should have personal exposure to the Russian leadership, including 
in-depth interviews with members of the political elite. Published 
interviews and existing research should be combined with innovative 
ethnographic research in order to solve the puzzle of how power is 
channeled in nontransparent settings. Kremlinologist accounts of “a 
bulldog fight under the rug” have certain explanatory power but they 
excessively personalize the workings of the state. Given the depen-
dence of the Russian governance system on compliance with unwrit-
ten rules—sistema—attempts to restructure the rules of the game by 
changing the formal rules can have only a limited effect. This is partly 
because top-down efforts are difficult to sustain, and partly because any 
change in the formal rules introduces, and is perceived as, yet another 
constraint to be dealt with informally. This often results in readjust-
ment and a reconfiguration of the informal workings of the system 
around the new constraints, rather than a decline in the significance 
of unwritten rules.
The vicious circle of sistema reproduction is based on its nontrans-
parency: networks of insiders are tied together by following an unwrit-
ten code; members are recruited on the basis of loyalty; they are initiated 
and compromised rewards and punishment are distributed on the basis 
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of extralegal criteria; and the foundations of belonging to networks of 
power are hidden behind formal appointments and are nontranspar-
ent, feeding back into the reproduction of the sistema. In a way, the (s)
election of President Dimitri Medvedev can be seen as an illustration of 
the sistema where appointments are made on the basis of loyalty and a 
lack of experience in order to create a certain codependence.
Yet certain initiatives of President Medvedev can be interpreted 
as challenging the sistema and are important to monitor. These include 
recognition of the practice of oral commands from the executive 
branch of power to the judiciary and the dependence of the judiciary 
on receiving such commands (telefonnoe pravo) as well as the payments 
for appointments (blat appointments). Systemic behavior of this kind has 
never before been publicly acknowledged at the presidential level and 
measures to promote change, if successful, could help to break the 
vicious circle of the reproduction of the sistema.
ORAL COMMANDS
In the context of Russian politics and legal practice (especially in large-
scale cases such as the one resulting in the dismantling of the Yukos 
oil company and the imprisonment of Mikhail Khodorkovsky), the 
importance of oral commands is hard to overestimate. In Soviet days 
oral commands by the leadership used to be much more important 
and followed more closely than written decrees (ukazy) and instructions 
(rasporiazheniia) and they are still important in the post-Soviet context 
(Colton, 2007: 325; Baturin, 2001: 424). “As it tended to be in the Soviet 
Union, the party boss’s word was most conclusive when it was spoken, 
not written. If the two ever deviated, the verbal held. . . . The primacy of 
the informal oral commands and handshake agreements reflected the 
weakness of the law, insidious secrecy and mistrust, and the need for 
authority figures to cut through the thicket of often conflicting admin-
istrative requirements (Colton, 2007: 82). Colton also tells a story about 
an official who reproached his subordinate for implementing his writ-
ten instruction: “If I wanted you to do something, I would have called 
you.”6 The punch line of this story offers not simply a commentary on 
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the significance of oral communication in the top echelons of power in 
Russia but also shows that subordinates have to be alert to the status of 
various documents and be able to interpret them correctly.
Informal ties, tested or created by processes of recruitment and 
promotion into political elites, aim at sustaining compliance with 
unwritten rules and oral commands. Linguistic idioms are the best 
evidence of the importance of competence in unwritten rules and the 
know-how, enabling one “to go on” and not to “fall out of the system” 
but they are hard to translate. As a celebrated aphorism goes, a “get it 
done” resolution on a document can mean anything from “do it imme-
diately” to “don’t do it no matter what.” There are colloquial definitions 
of compliance with the sistema: “don’t complicate life to yourself or 
others”; “don’t play with fire” (ne igrai s ognem), “don’t go overboard” (ne 
lez’ na rozhon), “don’t run in front of the train” (ne begi vperedi parovoza), 
“don’t be more saintly than the pope” (ne bud’ svyatee papy rimskogo), 
“don’t make a circus” (ne ustraivai balagan); “cut corners and don’t focus 
on them where unnecessary” (ne obostryai tam gde eto ne nado); “don’t 
politicize matters where not necessary” and other unspecified instruc-
tions that presuppose skills to distinguish between “where necessary” 
and “where not necessary” as well as the sensitivity to perceive threats 
and signals unnoticeable for outsiders.7 
This obvious difference between the formal flow of signed docu-
ments and informal (oral) commands related to implementation illus-
trates the degree to which discretion and continuing nontransparency 
exists in post-Soviet governance. The governance patterns rest upon, 
and help reproduce, concentric circles of insiders, most secretive at 
the top and most inclusive at the bottom of governing bodies. A mani-
fest function of this pattern of governance is to preserve discretion 
and to achieve additional control and manageability on the basis of 
informal leverage in order to pursue declared goals. The latent func-
tion, however, is to distinguish between insiders and outsiders and to 
benefit the insiders along the lines of “for friends we have everything, 
for enemies we have law.” The unintended consequence is not only the 
selective use of law, which is almost unavoidable in circumstances of 
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omnipresent offence, but also the use of law for extralegal purposes, 
as “ammunition” to punish noncompliance or to pursue other targets 
(see table 3). 
The table shows that many respondents found it difficult to 
answer the question (27 percent). However, those who volunteered 
judgments on the nonalternative multiple choices produce a somewhat 
shocking result. A dismally low share of respondents associated the 
judicial system with the rule of law: only 4 percent were convinced that 
the judicial system was not used for any unlawful purposes. The remain-
ing responses emphasized the misuse of law for political purposes 
(21 percent for political ends or 27 percent for show trials), closely 
followed by commercial purposes (20 percent) and personal vendettas 
(16 percent). Nineteen percent assumed that the judicial system might 
be used manipulatively but pointed out the lack of information about 
Table 3. “Do You Think that the Russian Judicial System Has Been Used for 
Unlawful Purposes in the Last Seven Years?” 
(Respondents were invited to make multiple choices)
Yes, show trials are conducted to demonstrate to the society 
the attitude of the authority to certain actions or phenom-
ena
27
Yes, the judicial system is used for political ends, in order to 
pursue and to get rid of political opponents
21
Yes, the judicial system is used in order to settle personal 
conflicts and for revenge
16
Yes, the judicial system is used to undermine business 
competitors, to ruin their reputation or to capture their busi-
ness 
20
It might be used, but it is little known about 19
Even if it is used, it serves the right purposes 3
No, the judicial system in Russia is not used for any unlawful 
purposes
4
Difficult to say 27
Note: Survey conducted 15-25 June, 2007.
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it. It is not surprising therefore that at any level in the hierarchy, the 
fear of pending punishment and dependence on superiors makes their 
oral commands and the overall informal order rather effective. Insiders 
understand the limitations of formal rules and the necessity of working 
around them and they develop a routine behavior that in fact makes 
situations of real choice or lack of directive uncomfortable.
In exceptional cases, when an oral command is too risky, asking 
for a written instruction has been a tactical means of noncompli-
ance. One of my respondents, himself a party apparatchik in the past, 
explained the importance of the “selection of cadres” process (podbor 
kadrov), designed to test character, compatibility and team qualities, 
which results in independent-minded “cadres” not being recruited or 
promoted.8 Judges were susceptible to pressure because they relied 
on local communist leaders for their jobs—judges were renominated 
every five years by the local arty boss—and for favors, such as apart-
ments and vacations (Solomon and Foglesong, 2000: 29). In Soviet days, 
the mechanisms of checks and balances that help to ensure patterns of 
good governance, such as an independent media, public opinion and 
civil society, were not developed enough to tackle the areas where oral 
commands operated but this was party compensated by the party disci-
pline. The Communist party regime made state intervention a norm 
and allowed, if not legitimized, certain informal practices in order to 
help the economy, achieve political goals, and support the ideological 
struggle, including matters in the judicial sphere (Berliner, 1957; Nove 
1977; Solomon, 1992).
Now that the present-day political regime declares itself in favor 
of constitutional rights, separation of powers, independence of the 
judiciary, and guarantees for property rights, oral commands should be 
viewed as a form of corruption (Global Corruption Report, 2007). However, 
it has been shown that it is hard to change the patterns of informality 
that emerged within the Soviet governance system, where the workings 
of formal institutions required informal leverage and loyalties created 
by a personalized system of recruitment. Even the courts and the judi-
ciary are subject to informal influence. It remains to be seen whether 
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the president-prompted package of anticorruption legislation amended 
in its third and final reading by the State Duma on December 19, 2009 
will be enforced in practice. 
TELEPHONE JUSTICE
If the arrival of President Vladimir Putin is associated with the decline of 
the influence of criminal groups in favor of the influence of siloviki, the 
arrival of President Medvedev might result, if successful, in the replace-
ment of the influence of siloviki by the influence of civiliki, a network of 
graduates of the law department of Leningrad State University, now 
holding key positions at the Arbitration and Constitutional Courts 
(Stack, 2008: 8-10). Following up on his pre-election promise to tackle 
society’s “legal nihilism,” Medvedev has declared a crackdown on 
so-called telephone justice: the practice of exerting pressure, making 
informal requests, or offering money for certain decisions in courts 
(NEWSru.com, May 2008). 
“Telephone justice” originated during the Soviet period (Solomon, 
1992; Huskey, 1992; Gorlizki, 1997). When a top official wanted a 
particular result in court, he would simply phone the judge and explain 
the party line. Although communist ideology is long gone, pressure 
on courts continues to exist—in spite of reforms of the judicial system 
in the 1990s and Putin’s 40 percent pay raise for judges and financial 
support for the courts (Pastukhov, 2002). After almost two decades 
of reform, the situation has only improved to some degree (Hendley, 
2007). Medvedev’s priority is, in his own words, to eliminate “the prac-
tice of unfair decisions made through connections or for money” and 
“to make the judicial system genuinely independent from the execu-
tive and legislative branches of power” (Medvedev, 2008).
In September 2005 a woman was sentenced for her attempt to 
influence a court decision by making a telephone call about a property 
in central Moscow, pretending to be calling on behalf of the chairman 
of the Supreme Arbitration Court (Kulikov, 2005). In an interview to 
Parlamentskaya Gazeta at the time, the chairman of the Moscow District 
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Federal Arbitration Court, Liudmila Maikova was asked, “How strong is 
telephone justice in Russia? Is it hard for the court to be independent?” 
She dismissed the whole idea as gossip and myth (Maikova, 2005), as 
did the chair of the Moscow City Court, Olga Egorova (Yamshanov, 
2005). But after Medvedev came to power, Maikova has been suspended 
on the charges of unethical behavior (Kommersant-Online, May 20, 2008). 
There has also been a defamation case against a journalist who accused 
a Kremlin official of “giving orders to the Supreme Arbitration Court” 
in a radio broadcast. This 2008 case is unprecedented: the deputy chair-
man of the Supreme Arbitration Court, Elena Valyavina, was called in 
as a witness and has confirmed the fact of influence on the part of the 
presidential administration (Dymarskii, 2008). Although her statement 
must have received a clearance from the court chair, Anton Ivanov, 
it is clear that political will was exercised at the top. Ivanov himself 
could have consulted his coauthor of an award-winning textbook on 
the Russian civil code, the man who is now the president (Gutterman, 
2008). 
How widespread is telephone justice in Russia in general? In 
an all-Russia 2007 national survey, almost one-third of respondents 
seemed satisfied with the workings of the courts (12 percent replied 
that all court decisions are made by law and 18 percent replied that 
only a few judges take bribes and are subject to pressure). More than 
half of the respondents, however, acknowledged the susceptibility 
of judges either to corrupt payments or other forms of pressure: 25 
percent of respondents said that judges take bribes as a rule although 
there are also principled judges and a further 20 percent said that 
even these principled judges would react to pressure on particular 
cases. Interestingly, the most pessimistic choice—indicating that 
practically all court decisions are made for a bribe or under pressure 
“from above”—was also the least popular, at 7 percent. The remain-
ing 18 percent of respondents were “don’t knows.” It is also indicative 
that in response to the question, “If you were to have a case consid-
ered before a court, and, in your opinion, it was unfair, which of the 
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following would you most likely do next?” 33 percent of respondents 
said they would go to a lawyer for advice about further action, 14 
percent would appeal (place a complaint about the carrying out of the 
trial or judge’s decision to higher authorities), and 9 percent would go 
to an independent human rights organization (for more details and 
regional distribution of data, see Ledeneva, 2008a).
Legal experts whom I interviewed in Russia largely agree on the 
following: although it is ridiculous to suggest that every court case in 
Russia is decided according to directives from above, ways to influence 
a particular case can be found if needed. In other words, pressure does 
not have to be pervasive to be fully effective. Moreover, the form of 
influence can be chosen according to the personality of a judge. Court 
chairmen have a variety of ways of dealing with noncompliant judges 
known for their personal integrity. Importantly, direct forms of influ-
ence might not even be necessary where the dependence of judges on 
court chairmen facilitates self-censorship—the “chilling effect.”
The difficulty with tackling telephone justice is that it relies upon 
informal rather than formal means—this is the point of the telephone 
call, as opposed to written communication. How can such a challenge 
be tackled by formal measures or legal reforms? Medvedev’s proposed 
working group will introduce new legislation and measures to push 
forward judicial reforms such as ensuring the financial independence 
of courts from local authorities, providing security and social protec-
tion for judges, and eliminating administrative influences on judi-
cial appointments and disciplinary procedures. Most such measures 
have been initiated before and have not thus far separated the judi-
ciary from the executive branch of power. It might be the case that 
patterns of informality should be tackled informally, by the power of 
oral command, thus turning the informal system against itself. Just as 
in July 2000 Putin redefined the rules of the game for oligarchs by warn-
ing them not to meddle in politics, from May 2008 Medvedev could 
have been sending “oral commands” (at least to his own presidential 
administration) not to meddle with the courts.
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BLAT APPOINTMENTS 
In July 2008 President Medvedev raised concern over appointments 
through personal contacts or by payment—“blat appointments.” He 
suggested the creation of a national database of public administra-
tors and a presidential quota for appointing professionals (Viktorova, 
2008). In a comment to Komsomolskaya Pravda, the leader of the Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) faction in the Duma, Vladimir 
Zhirinovski, claimed that the trade in appointments is a national prac-
tice and revealed the pricelist (which, notably, did not include the 
price of a place on a party list for State Duma elections). His estimates 
included: from 5 to 7 million euros for a position of a governor; from 5 
to 7 million euros for a seat in the Federation Council; between 3 and 
4 million euros for a federal service leadership position or for head of 
a department (Viktorova, 2008). A representative of the committee to 
fight against corruption, Anatoli Golubev, said these figures are realis-
tic but also added that the price depends on the level of contact though 
which the appointment has been lobbied (Viktorova, 2008). Contacts 
are the key dimension of appointment procedures, and the figures are 
indicative not only of the expectations of the return on the “invest-
ment” for the appointee, but also of the kickbacks to the person who 
had helped with the appointment. 
The role of contacts for public administration appointments 
seems to be much more prevalent than professionalism, which is said 
to be the reverse of the business sector. According to a survey of 170 
Russian top managers and owners of large companies in different sectors 
that was conducted in 2004 by a headhunting firm, Rosekspert, and the 
Association of Managers of Russia, contacts have been ranked relatively 
low (5.84) and in eighth place in comparison to the top three factors of 
success: professionalism (2.64), leadership qualities (3.08), and educa-
tion (3.67), with the rank of 1 being given the most important factor for 
success in business (Promptova and Chernov, 2004). Ten years earlier, 
data from the All-Russia Center of Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) 
confirmed that contacts were the key factor for success. Authors of 
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the survey interpreted the decline in the role of contacts as a function 
of the rise in competitiveness—not a solution for public administra-
tion. Qualitative data from the same survey, however, suggest that it is 
impossible to separate, for example, education from professionalism, 
and from contacts (Promptova and Chernov, 2004). There has been a 
change in the meaning of “contacts” as well. If in the 1990s the entire 
business sphere worked on the basis of prior existing relationships 
and trust—what used to be called blat—the development of markets 
since then has resulted in the need to expand contacts which implies 
networking skills rather than blat.9 
Personalizing appointments in public administration has more 
functions than simple channeling of information or help with obtain-
ing a job. Blat appointments tie up appointees with informal commit-
ments to the boss and the contact who recommended him/her (lichnoe 
poruchitel’stvo). Again, in societies where loyalty is the essential operat-
ing principle in public administration with rewards distributed through 
the system of perks and informal payments, an independent profes-
sional with whistle-blowing potential is unemployable. In this context, 
personal networks substitute for professionalism or complement it 
with informal control. As opposed to open networks of independent 
agents, based on professional expertise as well as making the most of a 
formal context, kin and social networks in Russia function in a pre- or 
anti-modern way to enforce loyalty and compliance with the informal 
ways of getting things done (Rose, 2001, 2007), which is now largely 
appropriated by the elites and the new middle class (Ledeneva, 2008b). 
My research shows that informal practices, especially those 
based on interaction between public administration and business or 
banking services, are essential for the operation of both the formal and 
informal economy and for compensating for the defects of impersonal 
systems of trust in Russia (Ledeneva, 2006). Informal payments—kick-
backs (otkat)—have become the core modus operandi of the informal 
exchange of favours and imply a high degree of interpersonal trust 
(loyalty, dependence) in informal transactions. According to Alexander 
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Chepurenko, of the Higher School of Economics, state officials accu-
mulate significant economic resources by combining rent-seeking 
behavior and the corresponding income from “administrative rent” 
with entrepreneurial activities and profits received by their family, 
relatives, or associates. In his view these rents, drawn from the use of 
“administrative resources,” are the hidden foundation of the growing 
middle class in Russia today. Correspondingly, the social stability asso-
ciated with the middle class is rather specific, since it is based on shad-
owy rental incomes that state officials squeeze out of their positions 
in formal and informal hierarchies—“in other words, bribes and kick-
backs” (Iusupova, 2007). 
At the top end of the spectrum of kickbacks is rental income asso-
ciated with state capture. According to expert estimates, “governmen-
tal services” include: “introduction of an entry into the budget (from 4 
percent of the allocation); signing of additional export quotas (from 10 
percent of market value); kickbacks for the signature of a state order 
(20 percent of the sum); transfer of a budget allocation (from 5 percent 
of the sum); kickbacks for the export of cheap gas (50 percent of the 
difference between the market and agreed price)” (Davydova, 2006).
Actual numeric estimates are not as important as the identified 
patterns of services—the informal practices that penetrate all branches 
of power. In the legislative branch, so-called deputy’s services (depu-
tatskie) include: custom-made legislation (from $0.5 million); introduc-
tion of draft legislation for consideration in the State Duma (from $0.5 
million); introduction of amendments to legislation (from $0.2 million); 
adoption of legislation on tax, customs tariff, and customs regulation 
(from 10 percent of potential profit); a vote in favor of a certain outcome 
(from $2,000 per vote); organizing a deputy request to the General 
Prosecutor’s Office (from $50,000) (Davydova, 2006; see also Nemtsov 
and Milov, 2008).
Judicial institutions and law enforcement agencies equally come 
under pressure from economic actors pushing for favorable court deci-
sions and other services. The pricelist includes: initiation of a legal case 
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against a competitor—from $100,000; “purchasing” a court decision on 
the confiscation of assets—from $50,000; initiating a decision on the 
freezing of a banking account or its reversal—from 30 percent of the sum; 
facilitating the outcome of a commercial dispute in an arbitration court—
from $50,000; the freezing of assets—from $30,000 (Davydova, 2006).
At the bottom end of the spectrum (as estimated by a member 
of the public an anticorruption sites), the monthly pay for a small firm 
is around $1,000. It serves to “establish contact” with various control-
ling organs (technical safety, sanitary inspection, police, fire inspec-
tion, local authorities). The actual sum depends entirely on the size 
of the company and its location. But multiplying an average of $1,000 
by the number of firms registered in Moscow, a very rough estimate, 
amounts to $200 million monthly, which is about $2.5 billion a year 
(Forumfontanka.ru).
INDEM research breaks out the actual payments in more detail. 
Although half of approached businessmen refused to share their expe-
rience with corruption, the answers received to a question about the 
share of bribes in the monthly turnover of their firms suggest that 25 
percent of companies pay up to 5 percent of their turnover; 13 percent 
of firms from 5 to 10 percent; 5 percent of firms pay from 10 to 20 
percent; and 2.5 percent pay state officials as much as 20 to 50 percent 
of their turnover (Satarov, 2005). This research shows that kickbacks 
vary from 10 percent on deliveries of IT equipment to 50 percent on 
orders for scientific research. The formal side is preserved: there are 
open competitions and tenders. State officials might delegate writing 
the IT task description to a computer firm that will eventually win the 
tender but reserve the right to request the appropriate kickback in the 
event of allocating budget funds to that particular firm. The task of the 
IT firm is to complete the task under budget. The majority of IT services 
to state-run companies such as Gazprom or RAO UES are loss-makers. 
The benefits come from their affiliation with the big names, not their 
actual contracts with them, the report states (Satarov, 2005). 
Given the economic rational for and dependence on kickbacks, 
there is little wonder that administrative reform in Russia is struggling 
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and that the principles of separation of powers and the rule of law are 
not operational. Yet the impact of informality is not seen as exclusively 
negative. One cliché about corruption in Russia is that the economy 
would not be able to work without it—the problems associated with the 
administrative reform, “administrative rent,” and the independence of 
the judiciary have to be resolved before anticorruption policies become 
effective. In the meantime, informality can be an effective policy tool. 
Russian leadership is known for imposing “corporate responsibility” 
and using informal leverage to promote the modernization agenda and 
to achieve strategic goals.10 In the long run, however, informal tactics 
undermine the fundamental principles of the rule of law, separation 
of powers, and secure property rights; ultimately, they compromise 
the chance of reaching strategic goals of modernization. This is the 
“modernization trap” of informality: one cannot use the potential of 
informal networks without the backdrop they entail. For example, 
just as it was easier for Medvedev to become president, it is harder for 
him to consolidate his own power base. Whereas networks of power 
enable their participants to mobilize resources effectively in the short 
term, they also create long-term lock-in effects that are detrimental to 
Russia’s modernization. 
NOTES
1. Some governments have sold offices to raise money. This was true, 
for example, of judicial positions in eighteenth-century France and 
of commissions in the army and navy in most European countries 
in the nineteenth century. As the vested rights of officeholders were 
an obstacle to reorganization and an impediment to efficiency, they 
were bought out or expropriated with compensation.
2. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a seventh paradox has been 
coined: everybody voted unanimously but the system has collapsed 
anyway.
3. A further challenge is to expand comparisons of developing countries 
into industrialized democracies and to establish whether the role 
of informal networks in the latter diminished and in which ways; 
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to analyze impact of informal networks on society in the context 
of modernization; and to discover still existing functions of these 
networks in, for example, the United Kingdom. 
4. In fully-fledged markets one can envisage its relevance for the world 
of gatekeepers paying each other for access to nearly every aspect of 
human life (as portrayed by Jeremy Rifkin [2000], where the institu-
tion of ownership transforms into “life-long access” to services).
5. Transparency International’s annual index (CPI) measures the degree 
to which corruption is perceived to exist among a country’s public 
officials and politicians. It is a composite index, drawing on 17 surveys 
from 13 independent institutions that have gathered the opinions 
of businesspeople and country analysts. The scores range from ten 
(squeaky clean) to zero (highly corrupt). A score of five is the number 
TI considers the borderline figure that distinguishes countries that 
do and do not have a serious corruption problem. See <http://www.
transparency.org/cpi/>. In 2008, Russia’s CPI score was 2.1 (which 
placed it as 147th of 180 countries included in the index).
6. Timothy Colton’s comment on the paper I delivered at the 
Postcommunist Comparative Politics Seminar at the Davis Center, 
Harvard University, October 31, 2005.
7. I have assembled the list of idioms from the novels by Pavel 
Astakhov.
8. I conducted 26 expert interviews in preparation of the survey on “tele-
phone justice,” some in London in June, 2007, but mostly in Moscow 
in August-September, 2007.
9. Opinions differ on the impact of blat on job markets. Some anecdotal 
evidence suggests that job markets are predominantly dependent on 
the use of blat (a recent advertisement noted that “if you don’t have 
blat come to a job center”). Another view is that professionalism is 
essential for big and international firms, where employees are meant 
to be competent and hardworking, but senior managerial positions, 
especially in the state-owned enterprises, invite competition not only 
in professionalism but also in contacts (Elena Nesmachnaya, “Ego 
velichestvo blat,” Pravda Severa, 2006-03-09).
From Russia with Blat    283
10. Oleg Deripaska, one the ten richest people in Russia, openly admitted 
that one has to be subservient to the Kremlin’s wishes; in the context 
of the future of his RusAL assets, he remarked that “If the state says 
we need to give it up, we’ll give it up” (Financial Times, January 23, 
2008).
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